Introduction
If our actions are a consequence of our capacities and preferences and if those things are, in turn, a result of our genetic inheritance and the external world in which we happen to find ourselves, is there a third factor, something not captured by our genetic inheritance or by referring to the external world in which we happen to find ourselves, by which we can say that we are ultimately responsible for our choices? 

Hard determinism denies the existence of a third factor and states that we are not morally responsible for our choices because we are not free in making them. Alternatively, compatibilism, or soft-determinism,  is the idea that moral responsibility is compatible with a causally necessitated universe. Many compatibilists such as John Locke recognize the existence of a predetermined universe but deny that our choices are solely based on outside factors. They argue that we are ultimately responsible for our choices because there exists  this third factor, in which the power to deliberate upon our choices is controlled by us. Going even further, indeterminists, or libertarians, such as John Paul Sartre would argue that we are not just morally responsible for our choices but the ultimate cause of our choices. Opposing these views, hard-determinists believe that genetic inheritance and the external world are the exclusive factors responsible for our choices.

Both hard determinism and compatibilism accept the idea that if we consciously control or affect our choices, then we are responsible for them, and vice versa. Therefore, for us to be ultimately responsible for our choices, I propose that the following two conditions must be met:

Genetic inheritance and the external world are not exclusively responsible for an individual’s choices.
An individual must be capable of choosing differently, or affecting the outcome in a way that results in a different choice.

Utilizing these two conditions, I argue that we are not ultimately responsible for our choices because we  play no real part in them  and there exists no real alternative possibilities. 

Denying the First Condition: Law of Causality
Hard determinist theories of a predetermined universe are based on the understanding that all actions an individual makes are wholly dependent on causes outside of the individual’s control. The logic behind this view can be explained more fundamentally from Kant’s law of causality which states that “for every action in the universe, there must exist a cause”. Applying this law to human choices and looking from a hard-determinist perspective, for every event that occurs in the universe, assuming choices are events, there must be a previous event that caused it. 

Let’s call the currently occurring event “X1” Consequently, before X1, there must exist X2, X3, … Xn. Eventually this chain of events goes back beyond our birth, which is out of our control, and all events are necessitated due to their interlocking connections. For example, I went to an ice-cream shop this afternoon. While it may seem that I was free in choosing to go to the ice-cream shop, according to the law of causality as I am applying it, this choice was actually predetermined,  and is a result of an unbreakable chain of events. 

When going to the ice-cream shop, I thought: The weather is really hot today, and I have the afternoon off. There is an ice-cream shop that is really close to me, and I really like ice-cream so I’m going to go there this afternoon. With all of these factors combined, I went to the ice-cream shop. Taking a closer look at the example, hard-determinists believe that we control none of the factors that led us to making the decision of going to the ice-cream shop. First, the weather is uncontrollable. Next, the location of the ice-cream shop and the afternoon break are caused by precedent events such as the location of my house and the job that I have, which are in turn, caused by another set of precedent events. And, lastly, my preference for ice-cream is determined by genetics and personal habits which are shaped by the outside world. Therefore, we play no role in our choices, but instead, it’s all the external factors that built up our desire to go to the ice-cream store. While people may say that this argument only suggests that we play no direct role in choosing, it doesn’t mean that we play no role. However, this argument actually shows we play no role because everything that humans ever knew (language, knowledge, and values) came from pre-existing causes. If we think under this mindset, then humans are intermediates that choose according to different combinations of causes. In libertarianism, individuals are free in their choices because they are free of outside hindrance when making those choices. Clearly, in this case, individuals are not free of outside hindrance when choosing but are immediately caused by them. 

Locke believed that our choices are ultimately determined by the strongest desire operating within any given situation. In the above example, the strongest desire is going to the ice-cream shop, therefore I chose according to the strongest desire. However, at the same time, Locke also believed in “the power of suspension” which means that we humans possess the power to deliberate which could change the outcome of the choices we make. For example, I might have thought through my options a second time and realized that I have a paper that’s due tomorrow. In this case, the power of suspension changed my strongest desire, and I have decided to not go to the ice-cream shop. Therefore, due to this, Locke believed that we are responsible for our choices despite not being their immediate cause. 

Addressing Counter-arguments: Power of Suspension & Deliberation

Despite Locke’s belief in causation and a deterministic universe, he argues that an individual is responsible for his choices due to “the power of suspension”. Explained by Locke, it is the power that  individual human  beings possess that “can suspend the prosecution [of desires] in certain cases”. The power of suspension is the ability to hesitate and reflect before a choice, and as stated by Locke, “it is the source of all liberty.” If humans choose according to the greater desire, then suspension is a moment when humans are weighing their desires. However, I argue, on the basis of my interpretation of Kant’s law of causality, that this claim, the power of suspension proves that individuals are responsible for their choices, is not true. If all choices are driven by something, then this power of suspension that is capable of overriding the strongest  desire must also be driven, or caused,  by something else. 

In the ice-cream example, when I decide to do my paper rather than going to the ice-cream shop, there’s a cause that reminds me of the due date of my paper. It could have been that I was educated to be a good student, or many other reasons. And, in that case, it is not about the power of suspension intervening, but simply because the desire to write the paper is the greater desire. Locke may argue that this desire would not have determined the action if it weren’t for the existence of the power of suspension. However, the power of suspension is already necessitated and part of the desires, then how could an external factor make us responsible for our choices? The experience of the power of suspension doesn’t make us responsible because it doesn’t change the pre-determined nature of the cause. 

In another example, where I deliberate before drinking alcohol, this deliberation that changed my choice doesn’t make me responsible for the choice because the choice is still pre-determined. But if everything is caused, why can’t the cause be the cause itself? The change in my choice is triggered by another cause, and the cause can be the way we think but never the thoughts themselves. I didn’t drink alcohol because my teachers, my parents, and every adult in my life told me to reevaluate the consequences before I choose to do so, and this way of thinking, which is shaped by the outside environment, led to the change in choice. On the other hand, I can not say that the thought of not drinking alcohol led to me not drinking alcohol, because one’s thought itself can not be the cause. 

Denying Causa Sui

Causa sui is the concept of “the cause of oneself” and is occasionally used to counter argue determinism theories of precedent causes. It is an alternative interpretation of Kant’s law of causality, and it supports that a choice can be generated from within oneself  itself. However, this idea is rather contradictory since a cause needs to be prior to its effect, logically speaking. I drink water because I am thirsty. Drinking water can not be the cause of drinking water. Thirst is a natural desire that is assigned to all living things, and it is external for which we can not choose to not feel thirst. Therefore, to reaffirm, the causes of our choices can not be the choices themselves, and this aligns with hard-determinist belief of the causes being external and precedent. 

Denying Second Condition: No Alternative Possibilities

Locke once used an analogy to explain alternative possibilities. A man woke up in a room locked from the outside, the man willingly stayed in the room thinking that he made the choice of staying in the room, but in fact, there was never the possibility of him leaving the room. This is a great image of our real situation that shows one is not capable of acting differently. Everything in this analogy is an accurate depiction of the situation except for the use of the word “willingly.” Locke believed that despite the man being locked in a room, the stay is still voluntary which makes the man morally responsible. But in an example in which this man is blamed for staying in the room, then it is expected for the man to leave the room. It is asking the question of “what should he have done?” But, in this case, the man is not capable of leaving the room. Therefore, lacking the ability to choose otherwise, the man is not morally responsible for his choice to stay. 

A person committed a crime not because he willingly chose to commit the crime but rather because he can not choose differently due to the iron blocks of past events. This results in a difficult situation for most hard-determinists because the current society appeals more to compatibilist ideas rather than hard-determinist ones. The implications of the hard determinist argument of no moral responsibilities mean that any rewards or punishments including the justice system is unjust. However, hard determinism can co-exist with today’s justice system, simply because they do not contradict another. If a car’s engine is malfunctioning, it is not the car’s fault but rather because of its design and construction. But at the same time, the car should not be allowed to go on the street because the car’s issues need to be fixed first. Similarly, in society, the reward-and-punishment system is necessary to keep an ordered world, and the goal of the justice system should not be punishment but rather rehabilitation. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, we are not ultimately responsible for our choices because two established conditions necessary for ultimate responsibility are denied. Despite the appearance of us having freedom in choosing, we are not consciously controlling our choices; therefore, humans are not ultimately responsible for choices that are not ultimately controlled by ourselves. 

Bibliography

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